REVENUE, PROFIT, AND VAPOR PROFIT AT IBM

 

by James Marc Leas*

 

Vapor profit is the paper boost to IBM profit from pension fund accounting rules.

  The profit boost is purely an accounting rule treatment: no money is transferred to IBM from the pension fund.

 

In the table below, the after tax profit column is broken down into vapor profit and all other profit.

 

5 year cumulative growth is the 2001 figure minus the 1996 figure for each column.

Source: IBM annual reports

                                                    Dollar figures in millions of dollars

 

 

                                 pretax   after tax    vapor      all other

                year  revenue    profit     profit    profit    after tax profit

                1996  $75,947    $8,587     $5,429      $157      $5,272 

                1997  $78,508    $9,027     $6,093      $377      $5,716  

                1998  $81,667    $9,040     $6,328      $550      $5,778  

                1999  $87,548   $11,757     $7,712      $799      $6,913  

                2000  $88,396   $11,534     $8,093    $1,266      $6,827  

                2001  $85,866   $10,953     $7,723    $1,450      $6,273  

 

5 year cumulative growth     $9,919    $2,366     $2,294    $1,293      $1,001

 

5 year % increase          13.06%    27.55%     42.25%    823.57%      18.99%

 

5 year average annual growth   2.50%     5.00%      7.40%     52.20%       3.50%

 

Lou Gerstner's key accomplishment was boosting vapor profit

IBM revenue growth averaged only 2.5% per year for the past 5 years.

IBM profit from all sources other than vapor profit grew only 3.5% per year for the past 5 years.

Vapor profit is one of IBM's fastest growth engines.

Over the past five years vapor profit grew 823%, an average compound growth of 52% per year.

Mr. Gerstner built vapor profit more than he built profit from operations during these past five years.

Vapor profit growth was 56.3% of IBM's after-tax profit growth these past five years.

Vapor growth was $1.293 billion of total profit growth of $2.294 billion.

Vapor profit accounted for 18.8% of IBM's after tax profit in 2001 and 13.2% of IBM's pretax profit.

 

Mr. Gerstner boosted vapor profit by slashing retirement pay for tens of thousands employees and by withholding
cost of living adjustment for retirees.

Since vapor profit is not real money transferred to IBM, no benefit accrued for the company or its shareholders.

In slashing retirement pay, Mr. Gerstner implemented age discrimination, and that legacy lingers.

IBM can no longer legitimately claim it is an equal opportunity employer.

 

Executive pay is tied to the profit report. Growth in vapor profit boosted the pay of Mr. Gerstner and other executives.

The company was damaged when executives boosted their own pay by slashing pensions long promised to employees.

Thousands of talented employees left to join the competition.

Enron management used various accounting schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the company, the shareholders,
and the employees.
IBM's actions to boost accounting rule vapor profit in order to hike executive pay are comparable to
some schemes used at Enron

 

* For further information contact James Marc Leas, 802 864-1575 (office), 802 734-8811 (cell),  jolly39@juno.com, vermontpatentlawyer.com

James Leas was the proponent of resolution 4 that was voted at the IBM stockholder meeting on April 30, 2002 in Louisville, KY.

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